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NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING AND REQUEST FOR COMMENTS
The Special Committee on Audit Committees urges interested parties to consider the issues 
discussed in this booklet as well as others they consider relevant. The committee will hold a public 
hearing on May 31, 1978, at the Hyatt Regency O’Hare in Chicago, Illinois. It will begin at 9 a.m. 
and continue as long as necessary to accommodate all those who request time to be heard.
Those who desire to make oral presentations should observe the following procedural require­
ments.
May 10, 1978 Notification in writing of intent to make an oral presentation, including the 
names of the individuals who will make the presentation, the organization 
they represent (if any), and the amount of time desired.
May 17, 1978 Submission of fifteen copies of written comments or summaries of proposed 
oral presentations.
Those who do not desire to make oral presentations, but who wish to submit written comments, 
should do so by May 31, 1978.
Requests to appear at the public hearing, written comments, and summaries should be ad­
dressed to
D. R. Carmichael
American Institute of CPAs
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036
Written comments and a transcript of the public hearing will be available for inspection at the 
AICPA offices in New York, and copies will be available for a reasonable fee.
An AICPA Requirement for Audit Committees: 
An Analysis of the Issues
The Special Committee on Audit 
Committees was appointed to study 
whether the American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants should 
require that companies establish 
audit committees of their boards of 
directors as a condition of an audit 
by an independent public account­
ant. If audit committees are to be 
required, the special committee is 
to propose a plan for the adoption 
of the requirement. This booklet 
describes the issues related to the 
study. The committee urges in­
terested parties to consider these 
issues as well as others they con­
sider relevant.
Impetus for Audit Committee 
Requirement
Voluntary establishment of audit 
committees has been widely advo­
cated. The board of directors of 
the AICPA has recommended that 
publicly owned corporations estab­
lish audit committees. The Corpo­
rate Directors Guidebook prepared 
by a subcommittee of the American 
Bar Association recommends the 
establishment of audit committees.
The New York Stock Exchange 
has long advocated audit commit­
tees, and effective June 30, 1978, 
listed companies of the Exchange 
must have audit committees of in­
dependent directors.
A bill proposed in the Senate in 
1976 would have required com­
panies to establish audit commit­
tees of outside directors. A recent 
report of a House subcommittee 
recommended that the SEC require 
audit committees, and a report by 
a Senate subcommittee recom­
mended that the accounting pro­
fession or the SEC require audit
SUMMARY
committees as a condition for an 
independent audit.
The report of the Commission on 
Auditors’ Responsibilities states 
that audit committees should be 
formed if appropriate to the size 
and circumstances of the corpora­
tion.
In a number of recent enforce­
ment actions by the SEC, compa­
nies have been required to establish 
audit committees. SEC Chairman 
Harold M. Williams has recently 
called on the AICPA to require 
audit committees.
Issues to Be Considered
The following are the issues on 
which the committee is requesting 
comments. The considerations un­
derlying these issues are described 
later in this booklet.
1. Should audit committees be 
required—
a. To assist independent direc­
tors in fulfilling their respon­
sibilities?
b. For an auditor to be able to 
fulfill his responsibilities 
under generally accepted 
auditing standards?
c. To strengthen auditor inde­
pendence?
2. If audit committees are to be 
required, should the requirement 
apply to—
a. All public entities?
b. All SEC registrants?
c. Certain SEC registrants?
3. What should be the require­
ments for the composition of the 
audit committee and the qualifica­
tions for membership?
a. Should all members of the 
audit committee be indepen­
dent of management, or is it 
sufficient that a majority be 
independent?
b. Could the full board of direc­
tors qualify effectively as an 
audit committee?
c. How should “independence” 
of directors be defined?
d. What other qualifications 
should be required?
4. Should a requirement for 
audit committees specify duties to 
be performed by the committee?
5. If the AICPA should require 
audit committees, should the re­
quirement be implemented in the 
form of—
a. An amendment of the AICPA 
Code of Professional Ethics 
rule on independence?
b. A Statement on Auditing 
Standards as necessary for the 
auditor to fulfill his responsi­
bilities under generally ac­
cepted auditing standards?
c. A membership requirement of 
the SEC practice section of 
the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms?
6. If an audit committee require­
ment should not be adopted by the 
AICPA, should it be implemented 
in some other manner?
7. Will a requirement for audit 
committees have an economic or 
competitive impact on public ac­
counting firms?
As a supplemental issue, the 
committee has also been asked to 
consider whether the independent 
auditor should be required to be 
present and available to answer 
questions at the annual meeting of 
stockholders. While this issue is 
not directly related to audit com­
mittees, it does involve similar 




The concept of audit committees 
is not new. Audit committees first 
received major attention in the late 
1930s, and in the last ten years 
there has been a significant in­
crease in the number of corpora­
tions that have formed audit com­
mittees. A 1970 survey showed that 
32 percent of the corporations re­
sponding had audit committees, 
while a repeat of the survey in 1976 
showed that 87 percent had audit 
committees.1 Many audit commit­
tees have been formed at the rec­
ommendation of corporate directors 
or management or at the suggestion 
of independent auditors. Actions 
by Congress, the SEC, the New 
York Stock Exchange, the AICPA, 
and others have also added to the 
impetus for forming audit commit­
tees.
Congress
Congress has recently expressed 
interest in audit committees, and 
several recommendations have 
been made to require corporations 
having securities registered with 
the SEC to establish audit com­
mittees.
Senate bill 3379, introduced May 
5, 1976, by Senators Church, Clark, 
and Pearson in response to the pub­
licity involving questionable cor­
porate payments, had as one of its 
requirements that companies estab­
lish audit committees made up of 
outside directors. The bill also 
would have required that outside 
directors constitute at least one 
third of the total board member­
ship.
In September 1976, the Subcom­
mittee on Oversight and Investiga­
tions of the House Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
(the Moss subcommittee)2 recom-
1 R. K. Mautz and F. L. Neumann, Cor­
porate Audit Committees: Policies and 
Practices (Cleveland: Ernst & Ernst, 
1977), pp. 8-11.
2 U.S., Congress, House of Representa­
tives, Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigation of the Committee on Inter­
state and Foreign Commerce, Federal 
Regulation and Regulatory Reform, 
1976, p. 52.
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mended that the SEC promulgate 
rules concerning corporate boards 
of directors to assure that—
• A majority of the board is in­
dependent of senior manage­
ment and operating execu­
tives and from any other con­
flicts of interest.
• The board’s audit and nomi­
nating committees have a ma­
jority of independent direc­
tors.
• The board’s audit committee 
has available to it independent 
expert advisors.
• The board has the authority to 
engage and dismiss the inde­
pendent auditor.
The Subcommittee on Reports, 
Accounting and Management of 
the Senate Committee on Govern­
mental Affairs (the Metcalf sub­
committee) stated in its report:
The subcommittee strongly believes 
that the accounting profession or 
the SEC should immediately re­
quire that publicly owned corpora­
tions establish audit committees 
composed of outside directors as a 
condition for being accepted as a 
client by an independent auditor.3
3 U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee 
on Reports, Accounting and Manage­
ment of the Committee on Governmen­
tal Affairs, Improving the Accountability 
of Publicly Owned Corporations and 
Their Auditors, 1977, p. 13.
4 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 19, 
December 5, 1940.
5 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 
123, March 23, 1972.
6 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 
126, July 5, 1972.
7 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 
165, December 20, 1974.
8 Summaries of the SEC’s findings in its
investigation of National Telephone Co., 
Inc., and of SEC v. Killearn Properties, 
Inc., No. TCA-75-67 (N.D.Fla. May 
1977), are included in Appendixes C 
and D. Audit committees were also re­
quired by the SEC in settlements of 
two other lawsuits, SEC v. Mattel, Inc., 
No. 74 Civ. 1185 (D.D.C. October 1, 
1974), and SEC v. Lum’s, Inc., No. 71 
Civ. 5323 (S.D.N.Y. April 11, 1974).
Securities and Exchange 
Commission
In 1940, as a result of the McKes­
son & Robbins case, the SEC rec­
ommended the “establishment of a 
committee to be selected from non- 
officer members of the board of 
directors which shall make all com­
pany or management nominations 
of auditors and shall be charged 
with the duty of arranging the de­
tails of the engagement.” Also in­
cluded was a recommendation for 
the current election of auditors at 
the annual meetings of stockhold­
ers.4 In 1972, while citing its previ­
ous recommendation and the 1967 
recommendation of the AICPA, the 
SEC endorsed the establishment of 
audit committees by all publicly 
held corporations.5 The stated in­
tention of these recommendations 
was to impress on the auditor his 
responsibilities to investors, partic­
ularly the need for independence. 
The SEC noted, “The existence of 
an audit committee of the board of 
directors, particularly if composed 
of outside directors, should also 
strengthen such independence.”6
In 1974, the SEC amended its 
regulation 14A to require disclosure 
in proxy statements stating whether 
the board of directors has an audit 
committee and, if so, the names of 
the committee members.7
In recent years, the SEC has re­
quired, as a result of enforcement 
proceedings, that individual cor­
porations establish audit commit­
tees. In some cases, the SEC has 
specified the duties to be per­
formed by the audit committees. 
For example, in SEC v. Killearn 
Properties, Inc. the list of duties 
imposed on the audit committee 
was quite explicit. In addition to 
duties relating to the review of the 
independent audit, it required the 
audit committee to review (1) the 
company’s code of conduct and de­
viations from it, (2) all public re­
leases of financial information, and 
(3) activities of officers and direc­
tors in dealing with the company.8 *
In response to the recommenda­
tion of the Moss and Metcalf sub­
committees, the SEC has urged the 
AICPA to require audit committees 
5
as a condition of an independent 
audit. Speaking at the AICPA 
Fifth National Conference on Cur­
rent SEC Developments on Janu­
ary 4, 1978, Harold M. Williams, 
chairman of the SEC, stated—
The profession must take whatever 
steps are reasonably available to it 
— such as insisting that their clients 
maintain audit committees — to in­
sure and enhance its independence. 
If the profession is reluctant to take 
steps of that nature voluntarily and 
of its own accord, the Commission 
will need to understand why and 
how that reluctance can be recon­
ciled with a profession which de­
sires to maintain the initiative for 
self-regulation and self-discipline.
Chairman Williams indicated 
that this project will be one of the 
central issues in the SEC’s first an­
nual report to Congress on the ac­
counting profession to be submitted 
by July 1, 1978.
New York Stock Exchange
The first major endorsement for 
the establishment of audit commit­
tees came from the New York Stock 
Exchange in 1939 as a result of the 
McKesson & Robbins case. The Ex­
change’s report stated, "Where 
practicable, the selection of the 
auditors by a special committee of 
the board composed of directors 
who are not officers of the company 
appears desirable.” 9
to the White Paper Questionnaire Con­
cerning Recommendations and Com­
ments on Financial Reporting to Share­
holders and Related Matters” (New 
York: NYSE, 1973), p. 2.
11 New York Stock Exchange, William M. 
Batten letter to chief executive officers 
of listed companies, January 6, 1977. 
The text of the requirement is included 
in Appendix A.
12 AICPA Executive Committee Statement 
on Audit Committees of Boards of Di­
rectors, Journal of Accountancy, Sept. 
1967, p. 10.
13 Commission on Auditors’ Responsibili­
ties, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations (New York: AICPA, 1978), 
p. 106.
14 Subcommittee on Functions and Re­
sponsibilities of Directors, “Corporate 
Director’s Guidebook,” The Business
Lawyer 32 (November 1976): 35.
For over twenty years, the Ex­
change has required all newly 
listed companies to have at least 
two outside directors. In 1973, the 
Exchange published a “white 
paper” which stated that an audit 
committee “no longer represents a 
corporate luxury, but has become a 
necessity.” 10 At the urging of the
9 New York Stock Exchange, “Indepen­
dent Audit and Audit Procedures,” 
Accountant, April 6, 1940, pp. 383-87.
10 New York Stock Exchange, “Response
SEC, the Exchange has adopted a 
requirement that as of June 30, 
1978, each domestic company with 
common stock listed on the Ex­
change must establish and maintain 
“an Audit Committee comprised 
solely of directors independent of 
management and free from any re­
lationship that, in the opinion of its 
Board of Directors, would interfere 
with the exercise of independent 
judgment as a committee mem­
ber.” 11 The Exchange’s require­
ment was approved by the SEC on 
March 9, 1977.
American Institute of CPAs
In 1967, through a statement of 
its executive committee, the AICPA 
recommended that “publicly owned 
corporations appoint committees 
composed of outside directors 
(those who are not officers or em­
ployees) to nominate the indepen­
dent auditors of the corporation’s 
financial statements and to discuss 
the auditors’ work with them.”12
In July 1977, the AICPA Board 
of Directors again urged the estab­
lishment of audit committees and 
urged AICPA members to encour­
age corporations to establish audit 
committees. The board has also 
asked the American Stock Ex­
change and regional exchanges to 
adopt audit committee require­
ments similar to the requirement of 
the New York Stock Exchange.
Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities
In its report issued in January, 
1978, the Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities stated—
The board of directors, with outside 
members and an audit committee 
when appropriate, is the best ve­
hicle for achieving and maintaining 
balance in the relationship between 
the independent auditor and man­
agement. Therefore, the Commis­
sion believes that steps should be 
taken by boards, auditors, and 
when necessary, by regulatory au­
thorities to help assure that boards 
will actively exercise this oppor­
tunity. Where appropriate to the 
. size and circumstances of the corpo­
ration, board membership should 
include independent outsiders, and 
an audit committee should be 
formed.13
Others
The Corporate Directors Guide­
book, prepared by a subcommittee 
of the American Bar Association, 
states that it is desirable that 
boards of directors establish audit 
committees.14 *
A recently enacted statute of 
Connecticut requires that certain 
corporations of that state with at 
least one hundred stockholders 
must establish audit committees. 
In Canada, audit committees are 
mandatory under the statutes of 
the provinces of Ontario, Manitoba, 
and British Columbia and for fed­
erally chartered companies under 
the Canada Business Corporations 
Act of 1975.
The Need for a Requirement
Issue 1: Should audit committees
DISCUSSION OF ISSUES
be required?
Consideration should be given to 
the purpose of an audit committee 
to determine whether a require­
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ment for audit committees is 
needed and, if so, to determine to 
whom such a requirement should 
apply and how the requirement 
should be implemented.
Issue la: Is an audit committee 
necessary to assist independent 
directors in fulfilling their 
responsibilities?
A number of advocates of the 
establishment of audit committees 
see them as a means of assisting 
independent directors in fulfilling 
their responsibilities to investors 
and other outside interests. For ex­
ample, the Corporate Directors 
Guidebook describes the audit 
committee as “the communication 
link between the board of directors 
as representatives of the stockhold­
ers, on the one hand, and the inde­
pendent auditors on the other 
hand.” 15
17 SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 
165, December 20, 1974.
18 Harold M. Williams, address before 
AICPA Fifth National Conference on 
Current SEC Developments, Washing­
ton, D.C., January 4, 1978.
In its findings in the investigation 
of National Telephone Co. (de­
scribed in Appendix C) the SEC 
stated that there was a
need for adequate, regularized pro­
cedures under the overall supervi­
sion of the Board to ensure that 
proper diclosures are being made. 
Such procedures could include, 
among other things, a functioning 
Audit Committee with authority 
over disclosure matters, or any other 
procedure which involves the Board 
of Directors in a meaningful way in 
the disclosure process. With such 
procedures, the corporation’s share­
holders and the public should be 
more adequately protected from 
haphazard or fraudulent disclosure.
An audit committee gives inde­
pendent directors a source of infor­
mation on the operations of the 
corporation that is independent of 
management. It also allows the 
independent directors an oppor­
tunity to review information that is 
reported to investors and the pub­
lic. It may therefore be in the 
public interest that corporations be 
required to establish audit commit­
tees.
Issue lb: Is an audit committee 
necessary for an auditor to be able
15 “Corporate Director’s Guidebook,” p.
35.
to fulfill his responsibilities under 
generally accepted auditing 
standards?
Present generally accepted audit­
ing standards require the auditor to 
communicate certain matters to the 
board of directors or its audit com­
mittee.
For example, Statement on Aud­
iting Standards No. 17 requires the 
auditor to report illegal acts de­
tected in the audit to the appro­
priate persons in the client’s organ­
ization. SAS No. 17 goes on to 
state—
In some circumstances, the only 
persons in the organization of a suf­
ficiently high level of authority to 
take necessary action may be the 
audit committee or the board of 
directors.16
Other requirements in the State­
ments on Auditing Standards relate 
to reporting to the audit committee 
or board (1) the subsequent dis­
covery of facts relating to previ­
ously issued financial statements 
and the refusal of the client to dis­
close such facts, (2) material 
weaknesses in internal accounting 
controls, (3) nonconformity of in­
terim financial information with 
generally accepted accounting prin­
ciples, and (4) detected errors or 
irregularities in financial informa­
tion. (See Appendix B for a de­
scription of those requirements.)
When reporting such matters to 
the directors, it may well be that 
the auditor would be required to 
provide information that is critical 
of management. So an audit com­
mittee of independent directors 
may be necessary to permit free 
and candid communication. A de­
termination that an audit commit­
tee is necessary for the auditor to 
fulfill his responsibilities under 
generally accepted auditing stand­
ards may have implications for the 
form of an audit committee re­
quirement (see issue 5b) and for 
the composition of the audit com­
mittee (see issue 3a).
16 Statement on Auditing Standards No.
17 , Illegal Acts by Clients (January 
1977), paragraph 13.
Issue 1c: Is an audit committee 
necessary to strengthen auditor 
independence?
A number of parties have seen 
the audit committee as a means of 
strengthening the independence of 
the auditor. For example, the SEC 
stated—
Such a committee would lessen the 
accountants’ direct reliance on man­
agement and would put them di­
rectly in touch with outside mem­
bers of the Board whose perform­
ance was less specifically being re­
ported on in the financial state­
ments, thus increasing the account­
ants’ independence.17
The chairman of the SEC has 
also stated that audit committees 
serve to strengthen the auditor’s 
independence:
One of the avenues already avail­
able for strengthening auditor inde­
pendence is the formation of audit 
committees composed of independ­
ent corporate directors. In com­
panies where the auditor reports to 
an independent audit committee, a 
potentially important buffer is pro­
vided to insulate accountants from 
inordinate management pressures 
and to strengthen the auditor in his 
relationship with management — 
and hence his independence. Stated 
differently, the absence of an audit 
committee may diminish or impair 
the ability of an auditor to be inde­
pendent.18
The effect of the formation of an 
audit committee on the indepen­
dence of an auditor has also been 
noted in the statements of the New 
York Stock Exchange, the AICPA, 
and others.
While it is generally agreed that 
audit committees may strengthen 
the auditor’s independence, it may 
or may not be agreed that audit 
committees are essential to main­
taining the auditor’s independence. 
In the past, it has not generally 
been thought that the lack of an 
audit committee impaired the audi­
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tor’s independence. The public’s 
view of the auditor’s responsibili­
ties has, however, changed in re­
cent years, and the profession has 
responded with more stringent 
standards.
A requirement based solely on 
the auditor’s independence, how­
ever, may not be appropriate if 
it is determined that the require­
ment should not apply to all audit 
clients. It may be difficult, if not 
impossible, to justify how an audi­
tor could be considered not inde­
pendent with respect to certain 
clients without audit committees 
but independent with respect to 
others.
Applicability of a Requirement
Issue 2: If audit committees are to 
be required, to what entities should 
the requirement apply?
A requirement for audit commit­
tees may not be appropriate for all 
entities for a variety of reasons. If 
a requirement is needed, considera­
tion must be given to the applica­
bility of the requirement to various 
types of entities.
A fundamental purpose of an 
audit committee might be to pro­
tect significant outside interests of 
an entity (for example, large num­
bers of equity owners or credi­
tors). Significant outside interests 
will benefit to the extent that an 
audit committee improves the abil­
ity of the auditor or the directors to 
fulfill their responsibilities or 
strengthens the independence of 
the auditor.
The committee has identified the 
following types of entities to whom 
such a requirement may apply:
a. All public entities
b. All SEC registrants
c. Certain SEC registrants
Issue 2a: Should a requirement 
apply to all public entities?
To some extent, all economic en­
tities have outside interests. Some 
of those outside interests may have 
little direct access to information 
about the operations of the entity, 
and therefore they must rely on in­
dependent auditors and those per­
sons in the entity comparable to 
directors with responsibilities to 
the outside interests. Therefore, cer­
tain of those entities (for example, 
nonprofit entities such as munici­
palities or hospitals) may benefit 
from forming a group to function 
as an audit committee.
If a requirement is to apply to 
such public entities, the definition 
of those entities should be rea­
sonably specific and unambiguous. 
Consideration must also be given 
to both the legal forms of those en­
tities and the resulting responsibi­
lities of those associated with the 
entities to significant outside in­
terests to determine who may ap­
propriately serve on an audit com­
mittee.
In corporations there are identi­
fiable individuals—the directors— 
with recognized responsibilities to 
outside interest groups. Therefore, 
it may be appropriate that an audit 
committee requirement apply only 
to corporations.
A requirement that all corpora­
tions form an audit committee may, 
however, be too broad. The over­
whelming majority of corporations 
are closely held and directed by 
their owners. A requirement to 
have independent directors for 
those companies may not yield 
benefits at least equal to the costs.
Issue 2b: Should a requirement 
apply to all SEC registrants?
A requirement applying to all 
SEC registrants has an advantage 
in that it relates to a readily identi­
fiable group. Moreover, SEC regis­
trants are generally considered to 
have a fairly large number of 
shareholders who may be expected 
to benefit from the establishment 
of an audit committee. However, 
some public companies, for ex­
ample, certain banks and insurance 
companies, are not required by the 
securities acts to register with the 
SEC. Those corporations, too, 
might benefit from the establish­
ment of an audit committee.
If audit committees are to be re­
quired, consideration should be 
given to the costs of the require­
ment as well as the expected bene­
fits. If the costs of an audit com­
mittee requirement are too high, 
companies may be discouraged 
from entering the public capital 
markets. The difficulties faced by 
smaller companies in entering the 
capital markets has recently been 
a concern of the SEC and others.
Issue 2c: Should a requirement 
apply only to certain SEC regis­
trants?
A number of surveys have in­
dicated that a large and growing 
percentage of corporations already 
have audit committees. A require­
ment by the AICPA would there­
fore not be a burden to those cor­
porations. Unfortunately, most sur­
veys have dealt only with the larger 
corporations, and little is known 
about the prevalence of audit com­
mittees or outside directors in the 
smaller SEC registrants. Roughly 
11,000 corporations have securities 
registered with the SEC. Ap­
proximately 1,500 of those corpora­
tions are listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange and, as previously 
noted, are already subject to its 
audit committee requirement. Con­
sideration should be given to the 
need for, and the effects of, an 
audit committee requirement for 
the many relatively smaller SEC 
registrants.
If an audit committee require­
ment is relevant only to certain 
registered corporations, that class 
of corporations must be reasonably 
defined. The definition must relate 
the characteristics of that class of 
corporations to the expected bene­
fits of the requirement. A definition 
may be based on such features as 
the number of shareholders of the 
corporation, the size of the corpora­
tion based on amount of sales or 
assets, the extent to which the 
stock of the corporation is publicly 
traded, whether the stock is listed 
on an exchange or sold in some 
other established market, or other 
factors. For example, in Accounting 
Series Release No. 177, the SEC 
made a distinction among its regis­
trants when it required certain dis­
closures of interim information only 
for those registrants whose income 
or total assets exceed certain limits 
and whose shares meet several 
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criteria establishing that they are 
widely traded. Also, certain dis­
closure requirements under gen­
erally accepted accounting princi­
ples apply only to “publicly traded” 
companies, which are generally de­
fined as those “whose securities 
trade in a public market on either 
(1) a stock exchange (domestic or 
foreign) or (2) in the over-the- 
counter market (including securi­
ties quoted only locally or re­
gionally.)”19
Membership of Audit 
Committees
Issue 3: What should be the re­
quirements for the composition of 
the audit committee and the quali­
fications for membership?
For an audit committee to fulfill 
its purpose, the members should be 
able to operate independently of 
management. If audit committees 
are required, consideration should 
be given to the composition of the 
committee and the qualifications of 
audit committee members. Ad­
vocates of audit committees have 
recommended that at least a ma­
jority of the audit committee mem­
bers be “independent,” and some 
have recommended that all mem­
bers be “independent.”
Issue 3a: Should all members of the 
audit committee be independent of 
management or is it sufficient that a 
majority be independent?
A 1974 survey of its listed com­
panies by the New York Stock Ex­
change showed that in 84 percent 
of the companies with audit com­
mittees, the committees were made 
up solely of independent direc­
tors.20 The Exchange’s recent re­
quirement for audit committees 
mandates that the committees be
19 Accounting Principles Board Opinion 
No. 28, Interim Financial Reporting 
(May 1973). See also Financial Ac­
counting Standards Board exposure 
draft, Suspension of the Reporting of 
Earnings per Share and Segment Infor­
mation by Nonpublic Enterprises, 
February 27, 1978.
20 New York Stock Exchange, “Response 
to the White Paper Questionnaire,” p. 3. 
composed “solely of directors inde­
pendent of management and free 
from any relationship that, in the 
opinion of its Board of Directors, 
would interfere with the exercise 
of independent judgment as a com­
mittee member.”
On the other hand, some have 
argued that management directors 
may have a useful place on an audit 
committee. Because of their know­
ledge of the operations of the cor­
poration, management directors 
can usefully participate in the dis­
cussions with the auditors, and 
management should have an op­
portunity to respond to the reports 
of the auditor. It may not, how­
ever, be necessary to have manage­
ment representation on the audit 
committee in order to allow them 
access to the committee. It may be 
that the presence of management 
directors on the audit committee 
will inhibit the auditor’s com­
munication with the committee.
Issue 3b: Could the full board of 
directors qualify effectively as an 
audit committee?
If it is determined that it is suf­
ficient that a majority, rather than 
all, of the members of an audit 
committee must be independent di­
rectors, it may not always be neces­
sary that a separate committee of 
the board be formed to achieve the 
objectives of an audit committee. 
It may be that if a majority of the 
members of the board of directors 
are independent, the entire board 
could function as an audit commit­
tee. A 1973 survey of 855 corpora­
tions showed that in 86 percent of 
the nonmanufacturing companies 
and 71 percent of the manufactur­
ing companies, “outside directors” 
were in the majority on the boards 
of directors.21
21 Jeremy Bacon, Corporate Directorship 
Practices: Membership and Committees 
of the Board (New York: Conference 
Board, 1973), p. 2.
22 Mautz and Neumann, pp. 32-33.
23 Mautz and Neumann, p. 33.
Issue 3c: How should “indepen­
dence” of directors be defined?
If audit committees of indepen­
dent directors are to be required, it 
may be desirable to define or pro­
vide guidance on the independence 
of directors. For example, the re­
quirement of the New York Stock 
Exchange provides guidance on the 
qualifications of audit committee 
members that considers such fac­
tors as whether a director is a 
former officer of the company, or 
whether the director has certain 
business relationships with the 
company. (See Appendix B for the 
text of the requirement.)
Additional bases for determining 
independence have also been sug­
gested. For example, the survey by 
Mautz and Neumann indicated that 
a director who is affiliated with the 
company’s primary underwriter 
may be unacceptable as an audit 
committee member.22 The report 
of the Metcalf subcommittee re­
commended that directors with 
significant commercial relationships 
with the company (for example, 
commercial or investment bankers) 
should not serve on audit commit­
tees.
Issue 3d: What other qualifications 
should be required?
Consideration should be given to 
the desirability of providing gui­
dance on qualifications of audit 
committee members other than in­
dependence. For example, the 
Mautz and Neumann survey in­
dicated that some expertise in 
finance or accounting and know­
ledge of the specific industry were 
helpful.23 The effectiveness of an 
audit committee may, however, de­
pend more on the personal qualities 
of the directors such as integrity, 
judgment, intelligence, and a will­
ingness to become actively involved 
in the committee’s affairs.
Duties of Audit Committees
Issue 4: Should a requirement for 
audit committees specify duties to 
be performed by the committee?
The operations of an audit com­
mittee should be flexible enough to 
meet the needs of the directors, the 
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auditor, the company, and the in­
vestors. A number of sources, how­
ever, have suggested specific duties 
to be performed by the audit com­
mittee. (The duties assigned to the 
audit committees of Killearn Prop­
erties, Inc., and Phillips Petroleum 
Co. as a result of settlements of 
litigation are described in Appen­
dixes D and E.) Among the duties 
commonly ascribed to the audit 
committee are these:
1. Nominate or select the in­
dependent auditor
2. Review the arrangements 
and scope of the indepen­
dent auditor’s examination
3. Review the compensation 
of the independent auditor
4. Consider the results of the 
independent auditor’s review 
of internal accounting con­
trol and suggestions for im­
provements
5. Discuss matters of concern 
to the independent auditor 
resulting from the audit
6. Review internal accounting 
procedures with the com­
pany’s financial and account­
ing staff
7. Review the activities and 
recommendations of the 
company’s internal auditors
Additional duties sometimes sug­
gested for the audit committee in­
clude these:
8. Review and approve finan­
cial information to be dis­
tributed by the company to 
the public
9. Review changes in account­
ing principles in the finan­
cial statements
10. Review nonauditing services 
performed for the company 
by the independent auditor
11. Establish and monitor pol­
icies to prohibit unethical, 
questionable, or illegal activ­
ities by company employees
12. Review executive perqui­
sites
13. Hold a prescribed minimum 
number of meetings each 
year
14. Report on the committee’s 
activities in the annual re­
port to shareholders
Rather than requiring the audit 
committee to fulfill some of these 
duties, it may be more practical to 
achieve the same objectives by re­
quiring the auditor to communicate 
certain matters with the commit­
tee, for example, by requiring the 
auditor to consult with the audit 
committee in planning his engage­
ment.
Implementation of an AICPA 
Requirement
Issue 5: If the AICPA should re­
quire audit committees, in what 
form should the requirement be im­
plemented?
The committee has identified 
three possible forms an audit com­
mittee requirement of the AICPA 
might take if it is determined that 
such a requirement is appropriate:
• An amendment of the AICPA 
Code of Professional Ethics 
rule on independence
• A Statement on Auditing Stan­
dards
• A membership requirement 
for the SEC practice section 
of the AICPA Division for 
CPA Firms
Issue 5a: Should a requirement for 
audit committees be implemented 
as an amendment to the AICPA 
Code of Professional Ethics rule on 
independence?
Amendments to the AICPA 
Code of Professional Ethics must 
be approved by a vote of the Insti­
tute’s members.
Rule 101 of the Code of Profes­
sional Ethics states—
A member or a firm of which he is 
a partner or shareholder shall not 
express an opinion on financial 
statements of an enterprise unless 
he and his firm are independent 
with respect to such enterprise.
For an audit committee require­
ment to be implemented by an 
amendment of the independence 
rule, it must be determined that 
the auditor’s independence is suf­
ficiently strengthened by the exis­
tence of an audit committee to 
justify such a rule. In its state­
ments encouraging the formation of 
audit committees, the SEC has 
described the benefits of audit 
committees mainly in terms of 
strengthening the auditor’s inde­
pendence. It should be noted, how­
ever, that under the securities 
acts, the SEC’s principal authority 
with respect to auditors is through 
its power to define independence.
While it has been noted that 
audit committees may strengthen 
the auditor’s independence, it has 
not generally been conceded that 
audit committees are essential to 
independence. In the past, auditors 
have not been considered to lack 
independence solely because of a 
lack of an audit committee. The 
public’s view of the responsibilities 
of the auditor has been changing, 
however, and the profession has 
responded with standards that have 
been more stringent than those of 
the past.
If it is determined that a require­
ment for audit committees should 
not apply to all corporations, then a 
requirement based solely on the 
auditor’s independence may not be 
appropriate. It may be difficult to 
justify how an auditor could be 
considered not independent with 
respect to certain clients without 
audit committees but to be con­
sidered independent with respect 
to others.
If the functions of an audit com­
mittee are broader than solely assur­
ing the independence of auditors, 
an amendment of the AICPA Code 
of Professional Ethics may not be 
the appropriate form of require­
ment. Also, the Code of Profes­
sional Ethics may not be the appro­
priate vehicle to provide guidance 
on the operations of audit commit­
tees if it is determined that such 
guidance is desirable.
Issue 5b: Should a requirement for 
audit committees be implemented 
by a Statement on Auditing Stan­
dards?
Statements on Auditing Stan­
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dards, which are promulgated by 
the AICPA Auditing Standards 
Executive Committee and are en­
forceable under the AICPA Code 
of Professional Ethics, now des­
cribe several circumstances in 
which it may be necessary for the 
auditor to communicate with the 
client’s board of directors or its 
audit committee. (See Appendix 
B.) It may be desirable that State­
ments on Auditing Standards re­
quire that clients establish audit 
committees in part to assure that 
such communication is effective. 
The improvements in the auditor’s 
independence and the assistance in 
satisfying the disclosure responsi­
bilities of independent directors 
may be additional justification for 
a Statement on Auditing Standards 
requiring audit committees.
A requirement as a Statement on 
Auditing Standards could take one 
of two forms:
1. It could prohibit the inde­
pendent auditor from giving 
an opinion on financial state­
ments of certain specified 
clients that do not have audit 
committees.
2. It could require the auditor 
to modify his report on the 
financial statements of a client 
that does not have an audit 
committee by adding an addi­
tional paragraph, either with 
or without qualification of the 
auditor’s opinion.
As an ethics rule or as a mem­
bership requirement of the SEC 
practice section of the AICPA, an 
audit committee requirement could 
only take the form of a prohibition 
against giving opinions on the fi­
nancial statements of corporations 
without audit committees. Only a 
Statement on Auditing Standards 
could require the auditor to modify 
his report on financial statements 
if the client has no audit commit­
tee.
A Statement on Auditing Stan­
dards can deal more broadly with 
the relationships of auditors and 
audit committees. It is not limited 
to one aspect of the relationship, 
such as the auditor’s independence. 
Statements on Auditing Standards 
may also be more readily recog­
nized and accessible to clients 
than might ethics rules or member­
ship requirements of the SEC prac­
tice section. A Statement on Audit­
ing Standards may, therefore, be 
the appropriate vehicle if it is de­
sirable to provide guidance on the 
operations of audit committees as 
well as to establish requirements.
A requirement for audit commit­
tees might make it necessary for a 
Statement on Auditing Standards to 
define its applicability to particu­
lar clients. Statements on Auditing 
Standards do not now make such 
distinctions. In this regard, the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsi­
bilities has recommended that all 
audits be subject to the same stan­
dards. The commission recognized, 
however, that the appropriate 
auditing procedures will vary with 
the characteristics of individual 
clients.
Issue 5c: Should a requirement for 
audit committees be implemented 
by a membership requirement of 
the SEC Practice Section of the 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms?
In September, 1977, the AICPA 
Council established the SEC prac­
tice section of the AICPA Division 
for CPA Firms. An objective of the 
SEC practice section is to “improve 
the quality of practice by CPA firms 
before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission through the establish­
ment of practice requirements for 
member firms.” Those require­
ments are established by the sec­
tion’s executive committee and are 
subject to review by its public 
oversight board.
If it is determined that an audit 
committee requirement should 
apply only to SEC registrants, a 
membership requirement of the 
SEC practice section might be 
an appropriate method of imple­
mentation. Such a requirement 
might prohibit member firms from 
accepting audit engagements for 
certain companies without audit 
committees. The present member­
ship requirements of the SEC prac­
tice section already require the 
auditor to report certain matters to 
the client’s audit committee or the 
board of directors.
A membership requirement of 
the SEC practice section may not 
be appropriate if an audit commit­
tee requirement is to apply to a 
class of entities broader than SEC 
registrants or only to certain types 
of SEC registrants.
The membership requirement 
approach may have several draw­
backs. Although the auditing firms 
of the vast majority of SEC regis­
trants (over 460 CPA firms) have 
applied, membership is voluntary. 
A membership requirement would 
also require the development of 
suitable sanctions for noncom­
pliance. Member firms may also 
encounter difficulty in convincing 
clients to recognize its member­
ship requirement in the SEC prac­
tice section.
The executive committee is re­
stricted from setting membership 
requirements that “unreasonably 
preclude membership by any CPA 
firm.” If an audit committee re­
quirement is to be established by a 
membership requirement, it must 
be determined that no firm is so 
precluded. (See issue 7.)
Alternatives to an AICPA 
Requirement
Issue 6: If an audit committee re­
quirement should not be imple­
mented by the AICPA, should the 
requirement be implemented in 
some other manner?
As already noted, the SEC and 
certain members of Congress have 
recommended that the AICPA 
should establish a requirement for 
audit committees. However, if for 
some reason it may be inappropriate 
for the AICPA to make such a re­
quirement, consideration should be 
given to other means of implement­
ing a requirement. Alternative 
forms of an audit committee re­
quirement may include regulations 
by the SEC or other federal 
agencies, federal legislation, or 
state legislation.
Competitive Effects
Issue 7: Will a requirement for 
audit committees have an economic 
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or competitive impact on public 
accounting firms?
One of the suggested duties of an 
audit committee is to recommend 
or select the independent auditors. 
It has been suggested that in select­
ing the auditors, independent di­
rectors may favor larger, better 
known public accounting firms. A 
requirement for audit committees 
could therefore have an anticom­
petitive impact on the accounting 
profession to the detriment of 
smaller public accounting firms.
The committee therefore solicits 
comments on whether an audit 
committee requirement would have 
an economic or competitive impact 
on public accounting firms, the 
nature and extent of the impact, if 
any, and the features of an audit 
committee requirement that might 
create such an impact.
Auditor Attendance at 
Stockholder Meetings
Issue 8: Should the independent 
auditor be required to be present 
and available to answer questions 
at the annual meeting of stock­
holders?
While this matter is not directly 
related to the issue of audit com­
mittees, it does involve similar 
questions of applicability and im­
plementation, and therefore the 
AICPA Board of Directors recom­
mended that the possibility of such 
a requirement should also be con­
sidered.
Regarding this issue, the report 
of the Commission on Auditors’ Re­
sponsibilities stated—
Fulfilling the reasonable expecta­
tions of users for access to the 
auditor within the limitations im­
posed on such communication could 
be accomplished by a requirement 
that the auditor be present and 
available to answer questions at the 
annual meeting of the shareholders.. 
The same requirement should apply 
to due diligence meetings, which 
are held before securities are issued. 
We recommend that companies and 
their auditors undertake to arrange 
and announce such auditor atten­
dance.24
24 Commission on Auditors’ Responsibili­
ties, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations, p. 84.
Also, SEC regulations now re­
quire disclosure in the proxy state­
ment of (1) whether representa­
tives of the principal independent 
auditors for the current year and 
for the most recently completed 
fiscal year are expected to be pre­
sent at the stockholders’ meeting 
with the opportunity to make a 
statement and (2) whether they 
will be available to answer ques­
tions.
A requirement that the indepen­
dent auditor be present at the 
stockholders’ meeting would in­
volve some cost for companies. That 
cost may fall proportionately more 
heavily on smaller companies. It 
may therefore be necessary to 
define the class of corporations to 
which such a requirement would 
apply.
If it is desirable that such a re­
quirement be established, consi­
deration should be given to the 
means of enforcing the requirement 
and the action the independent 
auditor should take if he is not in­
vited to the stockholders’ meeting.
It would also be necessary to 
consider the most appropriate 
means of implementing such a re­
quirement—as a Statement on 
Auditing Standards or a member­
ship requirement of the SEC prac­
tice section.
APPENDIXES
A. New York Stock Exchange Audit Committee Policy
B. References in Statements on Auditing Standards to Audit Committees and Boards of Directors
C. Summary of SEC Findings in the Matter of National Telephone Co.
D. Summary of Final Judgment in SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc.
E. Excerpt from Notice to Stockholders of Phillips Petroleum Company Concerning Hearing on Con­
firmation of Settlement in Gilbar v. Keeler
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APPENDIX A
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE AUDIT COMMITTEE POLICY
Each domestic company with common stock listed on the Exchange, as a condition of listing and 
continued listing of its securities on the Exchange, shall establish no later than June 30, 1978, and 
maintain thereafter an Audit Committee comprised solely of directors independent of management and 
free from any relationship that, in the opinion of its Board of Directors, would interfere with the exercise 
of independent judgment as a committee member. Directors who are affiliates of the company or officers 
or employees of the company or its subsidiaries would not be qualified for Audit Committee membership.
A director who was formerly an officer of the company or any of its subsidiaries may qualify for member­
ship even though he may be receiving pension or deferred compensation payments from the company 
if, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, such person will exercise independent judgment and will 
materially assist the function of the committee. However, a majority of the Audit Committee shall be 
directors who were not formerly officers of the company or any of its subsidiaries.
Supplementary Material
In order to deal with the complex relationships that arise, the following guidelines are provided to 
assist Boards of Directors to observe the spirit of the policy in selecting members of the Audit Committee.
A director who has, or is a partner, officer, or director of an organization that has, customary com­
mercial, industrial, banking, or underwriting relationships with the company which are carried on in the 
ordinary course of business on an arms-length basis may qualify for membership unless, in the opinion 
of the Board of Directors, such director is not independent of management or the relationship would 
interfere with the exercise of independent judgment as a committee member.
A director who, in addition to fulfilling the customary director’s role, also provides additional services 
directly for the Board of Directors and is separately compensated therefor, would nonetheless qualify 
for membership on the Audit Committee. However, a director who, in addition to his director’s role, 
also acts on a regular basis as an individual or representative of an organization serving as a professional 
advisor, legal counsel or consultant to management, would not qualify if, in the opinion of the Board 
of Directors, such relationship is material to the company, the organization represented or the director.
A director who represents or is a close relative of a person who would not qualify as a member of the 
Audit Committee in the light of the policy would likewise not qualify for the committee. However, if 
the director is a close relative of an employee who is not an executive officer or if there are valid 
countervailing reasons, the Board of Directors’ decision as to eligibility shall govern.
While SEC Rule 405 may be helpful to the Board of Directors in determining whether a particular 
director is an “affiliate” or a close relative for purposes of this policy, it is not intended to be so 
technically applied as to go beyond the spirit of this policy.
January 6, 1977
APPENDIX B
REFERENCES IN STATEMENTS ON AUDITING STANDARDS 
TO AUDIT COMMITTEES AND BOARDS OF DIRECTORS
A review of Statements on Auditing Standards Nos. 1 through 21 indicates several situations in which 
an independent auditor should communicate information known to him to an appropriate level of his 
client’s management, including the board of directors or the audit committee. These situations generally 
occur when, in the performance of his work, the auditor becomes aware of an unusual or abnormal 
condition. References to these situations are found in the following sections:
323.01, .04 (SAS No. 20)
327.14 (SAS No. 16)
328.13 , .18 (SAS No. 17)
561.05, .08 (SAS No. 1)
720.06, .15, .18 (SAS No. 10)
The following SASs describe circumstances in which it may be necessary for the auditor to report to 
management or the board of directors:
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1. SAS No. 1, section 561, “Subsequent Discovery of Facts Existing at Date of Report,” paragraph 
4, states:
When the auditor becomes aware of information which relates to financial statements previously 
reported on by him, but which was not known to him at the date of his report, and which is of such 
a nature and from such a source that he would have investigated it had it come to his attention 
during the course of his examination, he should, as soon as practicable, undertake to determine whether 
the information is reliable and whether the facts existed at the date of his report. In this connection, the 
auditor should discuss the matter with his client at whatever management levels he deems appropriate, 
including the board of directors, and request cooperation in whatever investigation may be necessary.
Paragraph 8 describes what the auditor should do if the client does not adequately disclose the 
subsequent information:
If the client refuses to make the disclosures specified in paragraph 6, the auditor should notify each 
member of the board of directors of such refusal and of the fact that, in the absence of disclosure by the 
client, the auditor will take steps ... to prevent future reliance upon his report.
2. SAS No. 10 (section 720) “Limited Review of Interim Financial Information,” paragraph 6, states 
that the objective of a limited review is a report to the board of directors:
The objective of a limited review of interim financial information is to provide the accountant with a 
basis for reporting to the board of directors on those matters that he believes should be brought to its 
attention, based upon applying his objectivity and knowledge of financial reporting practices to significant 
accounting matters of which he becomes aware through inquiries and analytical procedures.
Paragraph 15 of the statement also describes the auditor’s responsibility to report to the board of 
directors when, in the course of performing a limited review, he becomes aware of weaknesses in 
internal accounting control:
If the system of internal accounting control appears to contain weaknesses that do not permit prepara­
tion of interim financial information in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles, and, 
as a consequence, it is impracticable for the accountant to effectively apply his knowledge of financial 
reporting practices to the interim financial information, he should advise the board of directors of the 
circumstances. The accountant also may wish to submit suggestions for changes in the system to permit 
the preparation of appropriate interim financial information.
Paragraph 18 describes the auditor’s responsibility when he believes that the interim information 
presented does not conform to generally accepted accounting principles:
If, in performing a limited review, information comes to the accountant’s attention that leads him to 
question whether the interim financial information to be reported conforms with generally accepted 
accounting principles, he should make additional inquiries or employ other procedures he considers 
appropriate to permit him to report informatively to the board of directors.
3. SAS No. 16 (section 327), “The Independent Auditor’s Responsibility for the Detection of Errors 
or Irregularities,” paragraph 14, describes the auditor’s responsibility when he believes that material 
errors or irregularities may exist (This statement was the first to specify notifying the audit 
committee as an alternative to notifying the full board.):
If the independent auditor’s examination causes him to believe that material errors or irregularities may 
exist, he should consider their implications and discuss the matter and the extent of any further investiga­
tion with an appropriate level of management that is at least one level above those involved. If after 
such discussions the auditor continues to believe that material errors or irregularities may exist, he 
should determine that the board of directors or its audit committee is aware of the circumstances. Also, 
he should attempt to obtain sufficient evidential matter to determine whether in fact material errors or 
irregularities exist and, if so, their effect.
4. SAS No. 17 (section 328), “Illegal Acts by Clients,” paragraph 13, describes the auditor’s actions 
after discovery of an illegal act by his client:
After it has been determined that an illegal act has occurred, the auditor should report the circum­
stances to personnel within the client’s organization at a high enough level of authority so that 
appropriate action can be taken by the client with respect to—
a. consideration of remedial actions;
b. adjustments or disclosures that may be necessary in the financial statements;
c. disclosures that may be required in other documents (such as a proxy statement).
In some circumstances, the only persons in the organization of a sufficiently high level of authority to 
take necessary action may be the audit committee or the board of directors. The auditor should also 
consider the implications of an illegal act in relation to the intended degree of reliance to be placed on 
internal accounting control and the representations of management.
Paragraph 18 gives the auditor further guidance when he is not satisfied by his client’s action with 
respect to the illegal act:
When an illegal act, including one that does not have a material effect on the financial statements, 
comes to the auditor’s attention, he should consider the nature of the act and management’s consideration 
once the matter is brought to their attention. If the client’s board of directors, its audit committee, 
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or other appropriate levels within the organization do not give appropriate consideration to the illegal 
act, the auditor should consider withdrawing from the current engagement or dissociating himself from 
any future relationship with the client.
5. SAS No. 20 (section 323), “Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal Account­
ing Control,” paragraph 4, describes the auditor’s reporting responsibility when he discovers material 
weaknesses:
The independent auditor should communicate to senior management and to the board of directors 
or its audit committee (or the equivalent level of authority, such as a board of trustees) any material 
weaknesses that come to his attention during the course of his examination of the financial statements 
if such weaknesses have not been corrected before they come to his attention.
APPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF SEC FINDINGS IN 
THE MATTER OF NATIONAL TELEPHONE CO.
In its investigation, the SEC found that during a period in which National Telephone Co. faced serious 
cash flow difficulties, the company made public disclosures (including press releases and letters to stock­
holders) which did not disclose the problems but which reported high earnings and “rosy projections of 
growth.” Furthermore, the SEC found that the outside directors were aware of the company’s troubled 
financial condition and were also aware of the optimistic disclosures.
Only one of the company’s seven directors, the chairman, was an officer of the corporation. The 
company had an audit committee of three outside directors, but the committee never met.
Though they were aware of the facts, the outside directors “did not take meaningful steps to see to it 
that adequate disclosure be made.” One director wrote to the chairman of the company threatening 
resignation unless the management kept the board more adequately informed. Apart from that, the 
SEC found that the directors “did nothing effective to ensure that they be provided accurate current 
information.”
With regard to the responsibilities of outside directors, the SEC concluded:
In general, outside directors should be expected to maintain a general familiarity with their company’s 
communications with the public. In this way, they can compare such communications with what they 
know to be the facts, and if the facts as they know them are inconsistent with those communications, 
they can see to it, as stewards for the company, that appropriate revisions or additions be made.
With regard to the audit committee, the SEC concluded:
Finally, the facts developed during this investigation demonstrate the need for adequate, regularized 
procedures under the overall supervision of the Board to ensure that proper disclosures are being made. 
Such procedures could include, among other things, a functioning Audit Committee with authority over 
disclosure matters, or any other procedure which involves the Board of Directors in a meaningful way 
in the disclosure process. With such procedures, the corporation’s shareholders and the public should 
be more adequately protected from haphazard or fraudulent disclosure.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14380, January 16, 1978, 
“Report of Investigation in the Matter of National Telephone Co., Inc., Relating to Activities of the 
Outside Directors of National Telephone Co., Inc.”
APPENDIX D
SUMMARY OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT IN 
SEC. v. KILLEARN PROPERTIES, INC.
SEC v. Killearn Properties, Inc. resulted in a consent decree in which the company agreed, among 
other things, that a majority of the directors of the company would be outside directors. “Outside directors” 
were generally defined as those who in the five years prior to their election had not been employed by 
Killearn or its related parties or who were not direct or indirect owners of more than 2 percent of any 
class of equity securities of Killearn or its affiliates.
Killearn also consented to a requirement that the board of directors form an audit committee of three 
outside directors. The duties of the audit committee would include—
1. Review the arrangements and scope of the audit and the compensation of the auditor.
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2. Review with the independent auditor and the company’s chief financial officer the company’s 
internal accounting controls.
3. Review with the auditor the results of the audit including—
a. The auditor’s report
b. The auditor’s perception of the company’s financial and accounting personnel
c. Cooperation received by the auditor
d. Steps to make the audit more efficient
e. Significant unusual transactions
f. Changes in accounting principles
g. Significant adjustments proposed by the auditor
h. Recommendations by the auditor with regard to internal accounting controls
4. Inquire concerning deviations from the company’s code of conduct and periodically review that code.
5. Meet at least twice a year with the company’s financial and accounting staff to review internal 
accounting and auditing procedures.
6. Recommend to the board the retention or discharge of the independent auditors.
7. Review all public releases of financial information.
8. Review activities of officers and directors in dealing with the company.
The audit committee would also be authorized to conduct investigations related to carrying out its 
duties and to approve settlements of certain litigation involving the company’s officers.
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Killearn Properties, Inc., No. TCA-75-67 (N.D. Fla., May, 1977).
APPENDIX E
EXCERPT FROM NOTICE TO STOCKHOLDERS OF 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY CONCERNING HEARING ON 
CONFIRMATION OF SETTLEMENT IN GILBAR v. KEELER
The Board of Directors shall appoint an Audit Committee, composed of at least three members and 
consisting only of independent outside directors, to recommend independent public accountants to the 
Board and to review and make recommendations to the Board concerning the audit. Only independent 
outside directors shall be authorized to vote on the selection or retention of independent public ac­
countants. In addition to nominating independent public accountants to the Board, the Audit Committee 
shall have the following responsibilities:
1. It shall recommend to the Board an independent public accountant to fill any vacancy until the 
next stockholders meeting.
2. It shall arrange details of the independent public accountant’s engagement, including the compen­
sation to be paid.
3. It shall review with Phillips’ independent public accountants, as well as Phillips’ Comptroller and 
other appropriate company personnel, the following matters: (i) Phillips’ general policies and 
procedures with respect to audits and accounting and financial controls; and (ii) the general 
accounting and reporting principles and practices which should be applied in preparing Phillips’ 
financial statements and conducting financial audits of its affairs.
4. It shall meet with the independent public accountants as required, but at least twice a year, and 
shall review with them Phillips’ interim and year-end financial statements, any certification, report, 
or opinion which the independent public accountants propose to render in connection with such 
statements, and any other appropriate matter.
5. It shall meet with Phillips’ internal audit staff at least twice a year and review all financial statements 
and the extent to which Phillips’ accounting staff has implemented any reforms proposed by either 
the Audit Committee or the independent public accountants.
6. It shall have the power to direct an investigation by the independent public accountants and/or 
Phillips’ internal audit staff into any matter related to Phillips’ business and affairs.
7. It shall recommend to the Board the policies which the Board should adopt and actions the Board 
should take to prevent any payments constituting an unlawful or improper use of Phillips’ funds, 
including the payment of finders’, promoters’, or consultants’ commissions or fees.
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